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Abstract: 
 
To date there have been a number of studies that have examined how policies move from 
one jurisdiction to another.  However, few of these have examined the micro-interactive 
effects of actors, necessary to understand how actors shape outcomes over time.  The aim 
of this paper is to engage with this micro-level literature through an empirical study of 
policy transfer in the field of architectural norms in hospital construction in post-Soviet 
states.  To do this we generate several theoretical assumptions that will link the transfer 
literature to wider debates in the governance framework.  The goal will be to discover 
how the power of actors interacts in the policymaking processes to influence outcomes 
over time and in light of learning.  What we hope to do is bring the interactive and dynamic 
effects that occur between agents attempting to shape the transfer process back into the 
transfer picture.  The aim is to show that power flows over time and that these flows alter 
the shape and outcome of the transfer process. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
 
In July 2018, a new health care issue animated the public in Republic of Moldova, a small 
post-Soviet country: doctors issued fake diagnosis of pneumonia for children (especially 
babies) in order to complete the hospital beds requirement and receive State subsidiary.  
One paediatrician went so far as to report: 
 
What happens there cannot be called medical treatment. In these hospitals, 
whatever the problem you go with, the final diagnosis is pneumonia...They don't 
respect any protocol. Why? Because doctors and directors are interested in putting 
such diagnosis. This is done because the financing of hospitals depends on the 
number of the patients they have.  (http://agora.md/stiri/47537/pediatrul-mihai-
stratulat--despre-doua-spitale-pun-copiilor-diagnoza-pneumonie-pentru-a-face-
bani--reactia-spitalului--guvernului-si-cna)  
 
To understand this issue, one needs to know a few things about the hospital reforms in 
post-Soviet states. In 2000 Moldova and Ukraine launched hospital reforms aimed at 
reducing the number of hospital beds and modernising the building infrastructure. Both 
actions were linked to Soviet inheritances: during the existence of the Soviet Union a large 
number of hospitals were constructed based on sanitary and building standards 
commonly issued for all Soviet republics (SNIP and GOST). These norms followed the 
principles of the planned economy more than the healthcare needs of each Soviet 
republic. During the first decade after independence, both Ukraine and Moldova started 
reducing the number of hospitals and focused on developing the primary healthcare 
facilities. Despite these reforms, the number of hospital beds remained an important 
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source of funding.  At the same time, the problem of the obsolescence of the inherited 
hospital buildings also remained unsolved, pushing patients to look for costly surgeries 
abroad.   
 
In an era of globalisation and increased interdependence, a number of questions relating 
to the import, export and mixing of policy models needs to be considered when examining 
policy change and development.  One way to capture this is through the concept of policy 
transfer and its analysis of the circulation of policy norms, institutions and technologies 
(Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 2000 2012; Dolowitz 2017; Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett 
2007; Stone 2000, 2016; Volden and Shipan 2008; Graham, Shipan and Volden 2013, 
2014; Hadjinski, Pal & Walker 2017).  While a range of scholarly work has attempted to 
capture these dynamics, much of this has been done through the lenses of globalisation 
and diffusion.  These studies often adopt an institutionalist explanation, using variables 
such as political systems, elections, path dependencies, laws, socio-cultural norms, 
institutionally informed tacit knowledge and perceptions.  In adopting structural 
explanations, many studies downplay the relations between actors and the power 
struggles constantly occurring (Gilardi 2012; Maggetti & Gilardi 2015; Graham, Shipan 
and Volden 2014; Lee and Strang 2006) and how these struggles shape the final outcome 
of the policy process.   
 
To bring these elements back this article will focus on agency and time.  While adopting 
an actor-centred perspective is not a new idea (Dolowitz and Marsh 2013; Powell and 
Dimaggio eds.  1991; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Scharpf 1997; Strang and Meyer, 
1993; Wolman 1992), this article will use it in combination with the transfer framework 
to examine how agent interactions shape policy outcomes.  The reason for focusing on 
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agent interaction is that preferences tend to be established through interaction with other 
actors.  The second factor, time, is crucial, as the policy transfer processes generally takes 
time and operates at different tempos.  Within these actors’ will often be in 
communication with and across networks, feasibly altering positions, which will influence 
short and long-term preferences, resources and power configurations.  Hence time, timing 
and tempo of interactions and actions influence the transfer and outcome processes 
(Bulmer, Dolowitz, Humphries and Padgett 2007; Peck 2002, 2011, Wood 2015a, 2015b; 
Dolowitz 2017).  Actors will make use of their knowledge during the transfer process to 
advance their preferences in three ways: instrumentally, conceptually and strategically.  
As such, it is important to stress that interactive effects change as power shifts during the 
transfer and policymaking processes.  Understanding how these changes are reflected in 
the way actors become involved in the process is crucial to understand the probability of 
transfer taking place and in what form.  In other words, ‘while institutions make things 
possible, people make things happen’ (Zahariadis 2014, 28; Saurugger 2013).   
 
To study the role and interactions of actors, power and structures in the transfer process 
in Ukraine and Moldova this article will develop a series of assumptions which allow us 
to examine: 1) How power relations influence the transfer and mixture of policy models 
from one context to another; 2) What influence time, timing and tempo have on actors’ 
behaviours and relations? 3) How contextual frames shape behaviour and how this 
shapes the policies that are subsequently transferred and implemented (for good 
overviews of some of these questions see: Dolowitz 2017; Dolowitz and Marsh 2012; 
Hadjinski, Pal & Walker 2017; Ward and McCann 2013). 
 
Methodology 
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This article adopts a case study methodology to examine the movement of ideas and 
polices from West to East, focusing on the key actors and agents and their changing 
relationships over the course of the movement and implementation processes.  The first 
step was to conduct a critical literature review of the recent empirical literature involved 
in the study of policy transfer focusing specifically on agency in the transfer process 
between international and national actors.  From this, we identify a series of factors that 
our study on the transfer of architectural norms from France, the United Kingdom and 
Germany to Ukraine and Moldova can help unpack and advance.   
 
We chose the modernization of post-Soviet states as an empirical base for two reasons.  
While a number of studies examine the influence of the European Union on these 
countries (Europeanization and European neighbourhood policy) a large part of those 
still underestimate the influence of national and international variables other than the 
EU’s on policy change (Saurugger & Surel 2006; see also Walker 2018). Second, while both 
countries are former parts of the Soviet Union, the power structures operating between 
actors at the domestic level are substantially different.  During the era of the USSR both 
Ukraine and Moldova had a common Soviet corpus of architectural norms for hospital 
building: the SNIP and GOST Soviet technical rules and standards.  At the same time, 
Ukraine had more resources than Moldova for hospital building as it hosted the subsidiary 
of the main Soviet architectural institute for healthcare facilities (‘Ghipronyizdrav’). Thus, 
during and after the Soviet era, Ukraine inherited more experienced consultants and 
architectural facilities than Moldova in the field of hospital building.  If we see that power 
relations both amongst domestic actors and between domestic and foreign actors, time 
and timing influence the transfer of architectural norms to Ukraine and Moldova in similar 
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ways, despite their different initial situation, the internal but also external validity of our 
assumptions can be considered to be stronger (Blatter and Haverland 2012, Beach and 
Pedersen 2013, 146).   
 
This article is based on qualitative process-tracing approach.  In the context of a broader 
research project, we conducted a three-year participant observation, mainly focused on 
the Kiev hospital project, by assisting the major meetings between the French and British 
architects and the Ukrainian decision-makers.  Furthermore, 90 interviews and 
questionnaires were conducted with key policy actors in France, UK, Ukraine and 
Moldova.  These interviews and questionnaires were designed to trace the processes and 
individuals involved in the hospital modernization, based on international standards, in 
Ukraine and Moldova.  A first set of interviews examined the construction of the Children 
Hospital of the Future, in Kiev (Ukraine) by British and French architects.  A second set of 
interviews examined the reconstruction of the Republican Hospital of Chisinau (Moldova) 
by German engineers.  A final set of interviews was held to judge the modernization of 
primary care health centres in Moldova, which was guided by the World Bank.  We will 
refer to a selection of these interviews in this article.   
 
Agency and timing in policy transfer studies 
 
Actors make transfer possible.  To understand this, most studies take a view that actors 
are rational beings, making decisions based on cost-benefit analysis: the higher the 
benefit in relation to the costs of adopting a foreign model the higher the probability that 
transfer will take place (Llaci, Dibra and Tabaku 2010; Mossberger and Wolman 2003; 
Rose 1991; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002, 2004; Dimitrova and Steunenberg 
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2016).  Actors tend to be framed as benefit-seeking agents with in-depth knowledge of 
the consequences of their acts, and who have the power to carry their preferred solutions 
though to conclusion.  This analysis results in a static view in which actors are not thought 
as being able of or needing to change during the transfer and policymaking processes.   
 
More in-depth micro-level studies on international organisations as change agents show 
a different picture, illustrating three different aspects that are lost in more macro level 
studies that consider actors as purely benefit-seeking agents: the influence of transfers on 
power relations at the domestic level; the role of time and timing on actors’ behaviours, 
and, finally, the influence of contextual frames on the policies that are transferred and 
implemented (Hadjinski, Pal & Walker 2017).    
 
Transfer and power relations 
 
During the importation of ideas, domestic agencies and associations can use foreign 
concepts to empower themselves in the policy debate, in order to ‘position themselves as 
indispensable components of the emerging policy solution’ (Prince, 2009, 178).  In this 
instance the success of this strategy depends on domestic actors transforming foreign 
information into a standard form understandable by other domestic actors, before using 
it.  By standardizing international ideas and information change agents are able to present 
information in a global form or ‘an assemblage perspective’, which was ‘indigenised’, as 
policies made their way through the policy process (Prince, 2009, 169; Delpeuch and 
Vassileva, 2009). Anders (2007) analysis of the public service reform in Malawi shows 
this phenomenon.  Here the IMF and the World Bank (WB) deployed specific tools to bring 
about reform under the umbrella of good governance.  Both organizations maintained 
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pressure on the Malawian Government until it implemented the desired changes (Anders, 
2007, 92).  Helping to ensure the success of the transfer (as defined by the IOs involved), 
as a condition of assistance, the World Bank insisted that the Malawi government design 
and operate a special organisation – the Public Sector Change Management Agency.  The 
purpose of this organization was to evaluate the activity of different ministries as the Bank 
released money (Anders, 2007).  As a result, the IMF and World Bank insisted on the 
development and empowerment of a new institution at the national level.  The belief was 
that through its establishment agents could change the power relations between the 
central government and its ministries.  The newly created agency allowed it to externalise 
the control of the reforms and reinforced the legitimacy of the central government vis-à-
vis its ministries which could shift the blame for stricter controls to an independent 
agency while, at the same time, implementing the reform.   
 
We find a similar example in Morocco and Tunisia where the EU and other international 
organizations introduced the idea of establishing participatory commissions and 
administrative decentralisation.  However, in this instance national decision-makers were 
able to adapt and use imported tools to favour their own interests.  Hence, instead of more 
democracy, the dominant domestic actors used the new structures to sure up their 
regimes.  Here, powerful domestic actors tolerated the transfer because the international 
organizations could not become involved in the implementation of the reforms.  As such, 
in many cases, ‘the aim of “decentralisation” which is promoted by many international 
projects, is transformed by local actors into measures of “recentralisation” that increase 
the state’s control on the local representatives’ (Allal, 2010, 112).  This illustrates how 
national actors can alter the power relationships so as to reorient the intended goal of a 
transfer as the policy process proceeds through the implementation process.  Hence, even 
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when actors appear to be subservient to the international, they can be in a position to 
change power relations, even to the point of deviating the course of the transfer process 
in order to frame it in accordance to their needs. 
 
Existing actors can indeed actively work at altering power relations when engaging in 
transfer (and the subsequent translation of the models into their home system), as do new 
actors when they enter the process.  Ancelovic and Jenson (2012) show how the 
International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) became a lead institution in 
transferring Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC).  In this role, it actively sought 
and benefited from the support of powerful actors operating in a number of European 
countries, such as the UK, Belgium or France. This allowed the ICTJ to find a platform and 
support in the form of the European Commission and the United Nations.  This reinforced 
the strategic position of the ICTJ in the eyes of the international community and provided 
it with the legitimacy necessary to forward their model.   
 
These studies lead us to assume that power relations, strategic moves, and alliances 
influence the degree to which the transfer will be accepted, pursued over time, or succeed 
as intended once implemented.  Hence not only the asymmetry of power between the 
receiving and donating agent influence the outcome, as rational choice approaches would 
argue, but also the capacity of agents to alter the dynamic of the policy transfer. 
 
Timing 
 
Policy transfer occurs in different, often overlapping, time cycles and at faster and slower 
tempos.  Wood, in her research on rapid transit polices in South Africa and South America 
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shows that policy circulation is rarely a rapid, straightforward process, but gradual, 
repetitive and at times delayed (Wood 2015a).  In particular, political time and individual 
time influence the speed and degree of transfer as can efforts to slowdown or speedup the 
process.  For practical purposes, political time can be divided between domestic time, such 
as electoral cycles and policy calendars, and international time, such as strategically 
planned moves and meetings of international bureaucracies (Goetz 2009; Dyson 2010; 
Saurugger 2014; Stone 2010).  As such, the time horizons, the sequencing, the tempo 
involved in the policy cycle, and the temporal properties of policy matter, are important 
but often overlooked in transfer studies.   
 
Where timing has been used, there has been an implicit (and at times explicit) belief that 
the longer the transfer and policymaking processes lasts the higher the probability of 
change (Bulmer 2009; Zito 2009, Ladi 2011), particularly as games develop and shift over 
time (Peck 2002).  For instance, Huré (2014) illustrates how JC Decaux hit obstacles to 
what they thought would be a straightforward transfer of its bike-sharing scheme and 
technologies from Lyon to Barcelona.  The key differences between Lyon and Barcelona 
concerned the length of time involved in the transfer and how this permitted new actors 
to invade.  In the case of Lyon, JC Decaux was able to work with a small number of local 
actors (public transport is managed at the level of the City), including a number of local 
political allies.  In Barcelona, the firm had work not only with the local level but also the 
municipality levels. This situation forced the transfer agent to operate on two levels of 
governance; which greatly increased the length of time the transfer took.  
 
Time and reorientation also appear in Kesa’s study of the transfer of police practices from 
Estonia to Georgia (Kesa, 2015).  Initially it appeared as if transfer would result in a basic 
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copy-paste of the model.  However, as the process drew on and new actors entered, the 
Georgian representatives ended up adopting a solution that was substantially different 
from what Estonian experts offered (Kesa, 2015, 106).  In this case, Georgia deliberately 
worked at bringing in new domestic actors to strategically slow down the transfer process 
until policymakers preferred models could be adopted and implemented despite the 
wishes of those proposing the Estonian model.   
 
Context 
 
While the role of time is clearly important, many transfer studies argue that powerful 
actors are able to get their preferred option adopted (Bocklehurst et al 2000, Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig 2009) regardless of the preferences of the adopting system.  This, 
however, is only possible if the power relations remain the same though the entire policy 
process and those in the driver’s seat do not change their preferences.  Micro-level studies 
have shown that in cases where initial actors have not remained active through the 
implementation of a policy, domestic actors tend to adapt or translate what is initially 
proposed, particularly after the policy reaches the local level (see: Allal 2010; Christensen 
et.al.  2008; Favarel-Garrigues and Startsev 2007; Mavrot 2017).  The gap between the 
original model and what is adopted in practice can be said to have undergone a domestic 
appropriation (transformation) process that re-orientates the transfer towards the needs 
and preferences of indigenous agents.  However, what these studies neglect is that when 
the initiating agent is able to remain active in the transfer the room for adaptation is often 
reduced.  This can occur due to the direct involvement of the actor (such as an NGO’s) or 
through learning processes where the initiating actor is able to educate local agents in 
 12 
ways that get them ‘on-board’ as partners in the transfer process, or when new 
institutions designed to monitor and control the implementation process can be created. 
 
Time and politics can complicate this.  While senders may be present for long periods; 
political time is a variable that changes, being a catalyst or an obstacle to transfer.  For 
instance, Huré found that Barcelona City officials tried to speed up the tempo of the 
adoption of the Lyon model so that the scheme could be adopted before the elections, 
knowing that after the elections the political environment would likely turn against the 
model, despite the fact that the importation process was well under way (Huré, 2014).   
 
Taken together these illustrations imply that on average the more control one actor (or 
set of actors) has in the policy process, and the better positioned they are to guide a 
preferred option through the policy process, the more likely the transfer will occur as 
planned.  However, the longer it takes, the more likely actors will emerge who will attempt 
to forward their own models thus altering the transfer and eventually leading to a mixture 
of lessons being combined into the final product.   
 
AGENCY DURING TRANSFER PROCESSE 
Hospital construction in Ukraine and Moldova between 1991 and 2010: elements of context 
 
During the era of the Soviet Union, both Ukraine and Moldova experienced the 
construction of a large number of medical facilities applying the principles of the Soviet 
health system (Semashko).  A number of those buildings were constructed during 1960 
and 1970 resulting in overcapacity. At the same time, the economic crisis of 1980 left 
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fewer resources for hospitals, particularly in terms of medical equipment and 
technologies compared to Western nations.  
 
In addition to the number of Hospitals constructed, a common characteristic of Soviet 
hospital design was strict compliance to SNIP and GOST technical norms and standards.  
The latter specified precise dimensions of the surface area of every hospital room as well 
as the medical equipment and construction materials to be used, leaving architects and 
administrators with little room to manoeuvre. In contrast, architects and planners in EU 
member states designed hospitals based on patient’s needs (and competitive calls), with 
technical norms eventually specifying the minimum or maximum dimensions and surface 
areas.  
 
At their independence in 1991, both Ukraine and Moldova inherited common hospital 
design characteristics and architects trained according Soviet features.  However, while 
Ukrainian and Moldovan architects and engineers shared a Soviet experience in their 
training, Ukraine inherited of a larger number of specialists in hospital design as Kiev 
hosted one of the regional healthcare planning institute.  Moldova, on the other hand, 
lacked specialists in the field before and after 1990. 
 
Power relations  
 
The assumption that emerges from much of the existing literature relating to resources 
and power potentials, argues that international institutions and powerful national actors 
use (amongst other things) technical and financial power as a way of transferring Western 
models into ‘less developed’ nations, particularly those wishing to ‘join-a-club’ (such as 
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the EU or WTO).  In our study on the transfer of Western hospital design norms to post-
Soviet states, we found that an asymmetric power relationship clearly influenced the 
transfer process.  In relation to Moldova, we found a fairly typical power relationship, 
where the World Bank was actively driving the hospital reform, using its financial and 
expert position to prescribe the content of the transfer that was subsequently integrated 
into Moldovan hospital projects.  Officials in the Ministries of Health and Construction 
confirmed this and to deviating from their own ‘national standards’ in order to receive 
external aid (Interviews: 15 & 30 April 2010).  World Bank consultants forced changes to 
the initial project presented by the Moldovan Ministry of Health.  As Ministry officials 
explained, the World Bank insisted on the construction of a higher number of facilities 
and fewer large spaces: 
 
Our building standards date back from 1982-1984 and we still use them nowadays. 
These standards provide requirements for the maternity, the stomatology building 
etc. for all the medical facilities.  They very clearly state the surface area of each 
building and those areas are very large.  The World Bank gave us a credit for the 
reconstruction of primary health centres in rural areas.  But their experts were 
shocked when they saw our standards: in their view, a rural health centre needs to 
be of more or less 100m², as it depends of regional health centres, so the surface 
area is very limited…Upon our standards, a health centre can be of 1000m² 
(Interview: 24 March 2010). 
 
Following negotiations, the Moldovan authorities altered their plans and accepted the 
advice of a group of Danish consultants, called in by the World Bank, who designed the 
medical facilities based on ‘Western standards’.  As a result of these alterations to 
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accepted norms, and in order to validate the architectural plans the Ministry of Health had 
to ask for a legal exception from the Ministry of Construction:   
 
We wrote a letter to the Ministry of Construction when we started the 
reconstruction of primary health facilities.  We explained that the World Bank 
wants us to build 35 centres of 100m² adopting the Western standards, instead of 
only 15 centres upon our standards in Moldova.  So, we asked for an exemption to 
our standards for this project  (Interview: 24 March 2010).   
 
In this case, the World Bank required the adoption of the foreign standards as part of its 
financial conditionality. More generally, Moldovan authorities were forced into 
compliance with the Bank because they needed the healthcare facilities and knew that a 
rejected project by the Bank would compromise any future projects.   
 
International funding bodies are seen as powerful actors using conditionality, technical 
knowhow and financial leverage to bring about their desired change.  Other international 
actors, such as consultants, foundations, and private firms are usually seen as soft agents 
(Simmons et al., 2008, Stone 2010).  As a result, the later organizations tend to develop 
negotiation strategies in order to convince others to adopt their solutions (Plugaru, 2014).  
In the construction of the hospital in Kiev, European private firms lacked the power to 
insist on the use of West-European construction standards, so they adopted strategies to 
convince the Ukrainians of the merits of adopting them.  When this failed, the firms chose 
a strategically important moment to issue warnings that they would stop the project if 
their conditions were not respected.   
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As in the Moldovan case, the major issue concerned the respect of national design 
standards necessary for obtaining the building permit.  During the meetings between 
Ukrainian and French-English contractors,1 the later first praised the Western practice 
for designing a hospital, but insisted on its incompatibility with the Ukrainian design 
standards:  
 
We asked advice from our local partner who knows the Ukrainian building 
standards.  He confirmed that these were inherited Soviet regulations and 
standards that stated specific size area and medical processes for hospitals, in line 
with the needs of the planned economy of that era.  There was no way for us to 
design the hospital we won the competition with upon those standards.  
(Interview: 13 December 2010).   
 
At a vital moment in the negotiations, foreign architects warned they would leave the 
project, knowing that this would have unacceptable repercussions on the Ukrainian 
decision-makers (especially the President who supported the operation).  They also knew 
that Ukrainian decision-makers publicly stated that in relation to the tempo of reform, 
they wanted to sign the contract before Christmas.  This led to a ‘reformed’ attitude on the 
part of Kiev who ended up accepting most of the recommendations.  The difference with 
the case of the World Bank (who simply applied coercive means from the beginning) is 
that the international firm involved in this project only adopted a strong-arm strategy 
after an opportunity emerged for them to push their solutions onto the agenda and were 
                                                        
1 These observations are based on direct participation at the meetings involving the development of the Kiev 
Children Hospital of the Future in July and December 2007, in Grenoble and Paris, France.  
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ultimately involved in the process of selling the merits of their ideas over that of other 
agents. 
  
Two points emerge from this: first, competition often exists among international actors 
attempting to offer a best solution allowing domestic actors to gain power beyond their 
‘natural’ position.  Second, transfer by international organisations does not necessarily 
depend on conditionality or coercive mechanism, rather it can be based on strategies 
designed to convince local actors of the appropriateness of preferred foreign solutions.  
In this exchange, local actors are not neutral or powerless, they are often able to combine 
solutions as a means of empowerment.  In a similar way, foreign agents can use transfer 
as a means of strengthening local actors; as a way of gaining a bridge into the endogenous 
policy process.  In this formulation, foreign actors identify and rely on (empower) 
domestic actors who use transfer as a resource that helps to increase their own power.  In 
other cases, international actors can, if the situation allows, bypass existing actors and 
stimulate the development of new actors who can forward their agenda or guide a policy 
through the policymaking and implementation processes.  When none of these work 
senders often find preferred solutions reoriented by domestic actors, despite their 
coercive or persuasive powers. 
 
Our case study shows how power relations between international and domestic actors 
influence the process of transfer.  Moldova’s Ministry of Health had to undertake actions 
in order to deviate from the national building rules in order to comply with the 
‘recommended’ World Bank reforms.  In the Ukraine, while international medium-size 
private firms seemed to be in a weaker position than the domestic actors, they 
nonetheless found a way to alter the situation in order to alter the negotiation situation 
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in their favour.  In light of these findings, we see that within the transfer process power is 
a nebulous and shifting commodity.  It is a commodity where powerful agents may need 
weaker agents, where weaker agents can use powerful agents, and where both can adopt 
a range of strategies to create environments favourable to their preferred ends. 
 
Transforming cognitive frames through learning 
 
Based on a definition of learning in the transfer process as occurring when an agent 
engages in activities that lead to a relatively permanent, potential change in their behaviour, 
understanding, and/or outlook, and that this is a direct result of information received from 
an exogenous socio-political system or institution (Dolowitz 2009), we discovered a range 
of learning activities taking place amongst key Ukraine and Moldova actors.  However, 
unlike much of the literature related to learning and transfer, we also found that national 
actors in Ukraine and Moldova did not uncritically engage in learning.  Rather they 
reported that they were more willing to adopt foreign ideas and solutions when they were 
convinced of the validity of the solution which involved a considerable amount of 
exchange and interaction rather than simple power point presentations or workshop 
participation (Dunn 1983). 
 
In Ukraine, national decision-makers were at first enthusiastic about the idea of Western 
architects designing.  This enthusiasm was linked to an extremely favourable political 
environment; the support from the Administration of the Presidency and the President’s 
spouse.  The first draft plans of the hospital were entirely developed by French and 
English architects (participant observation in the French architect firm Groupe-6, 2007-
2010).  In this first stage of the project, we noticed little learning as the Ukrainians insisted 
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on giving a free hand to the French and English architects: ‘We want them to design a 
hospital as they usually do in their own country.  We visited hospitals in France and also 
in UK and even in the US.  We chose them because we want the same for our country’ 
(Interview: 12 May 2010).  ‘We don’t want their local Ukrainian architect and partner to 
get too much involved because we are afraid, he will start to put his Soviet experience 
over it.  And this is definitely what we are looking to avoid’ (Interview: 14 April 2009). 
 
As the project advanced this situation changed as Ukrainians became increasingly 
sceptical about the designs being offered that they did not understand.  One of the main 
issues related to fire exits, which were differently designed in France and in Ukraine.  
During the meetings, Ukrainians asked the French architects for more detailed 
information:  
 
We need to have technical arguments and not only ‘this [is] how we do in our 
country’.  This was not enough at this stage of the project.  Especially we need to 
defend these foreign design solutions in front of our national administrations to 
obtain building permits.  So, we asked the French architect to show us the French 
regulations that present the fire exits they draw…We need to understand how this 
works elsewhere (Interview: 7 May 2010). 
 
These doubts on the efficacy of foreign solutions appear to be also linked to changes in 
the political environment, Viktor Yushchentko no longer being the favourite candidate for 
the approaching 2010 presidential elections.  It was at this time that the Ukrainians asked 
for more detailed information in order to be prepared to defend the foreign solutions in 
front of their own national administrations.   
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More substantial learning occurred when French architects offered plans for a maternity 
unit, which had a delivery room with a space for father’s change of clothes (meetings at 
French private practice Groupe-6, Paris, March – May 2008).  Ukrainian architects noted 
that ‘This cannot be possible in our hospitals’ as fathers were not allowed in the delivery 
room when a caesarean section takes place.  However, the French architects developed 
their argument basing it on the personal experience of one of the architects who was in 
the operating room during his wife’s caesarean.  The conveyance of this experience and 
argument convinced the Ukrainian decision-makers to introduce this design component 
into their hospital, arguing that it would be a way to modernize the countries healthcare 
facilities and attitudes (meetings at French private practice Groupe-6, Paris, March – May 
2008).   
 
Learning takes time and involves more than simple acceptance.  In this, the learning 
process is not always perceptible.  At the beginning of Kiev project domestic actors tended 
to be uncritical about the transfer, only when the details emerged did they begin to take a 
more active role in learning.  This forced foreign agents to provide information and 
explanations about how their hospital design facilitated hospital efficiency that they were 
willing to incorporate foreign solutions.  In this process domestic actors passed from a 
stage where they were not interested in learning but simply copying, to a stage where 
they didn’t understand the plans offered and remained resolutely opposed, to a stage 
where they came to understand and accepted the foreign design.2   
  
                                                        
2 Participant observation allowed us to observe the lengthy and detailed discussions that occurred between the 
French and English architects and the Ukraine contingent, and how this led the Ukrainian delegation to change 
their views in relation to relevance and use of international guidelines. 
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A similar process occurred in Moldova when German consultants attempted to alter the 
design of a hospital in Chisinau.  National actors rejected their solutions until they had 
gone through cycles of learning.  It was only after national actors had worked through 
ideas with foreign consultants enough to integrate the logic of the transferred solutions 
into their own cognitive frames that their opposition dissipated.   
 
It is worth stressing that when domestic actors did not engage in the learning process, 
they actively resisted the importation of foreign models.  The most striking example can 
be seen with the Ukrainian Children Hospital of the Future.  Here, local architects 
continued to repeat Soviet era practices even after being asked to modify their plans.  The 
reason given for their resistance to change was that: ‘We did it as we knew, as we have 
always done’ (Interview: 17 May 2010).  In the absence of learning, domestic actors 
worked to modify the foreign design according to their own experiences and beliefs, thus 
introducing what is often discussed as resistance to a transfer they were officially 
supporting. 
 
The importance of learning and knowledge updating can also be seen when we compare 
actors who engaged in the learning to those who did not.  For instance, after an extended 
learning cycle, officials at the Moldova Ministry of Health were convinced of the utility of 
foreign ideas. However, even after this, they faced opposition from bureaucrats who were 
not involved and thus were unaware of the advantages taught to the officials.  As a result, 
the latter were attached to the Soviet standards as the only ones they were sure of:  
 
In order to validate a different standard, I need to be convinced of its efficiency.  I 
need to see how things can work differently…But we have technicians in our 
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country who have never seen a Western hospital.  Usually, it is the Board who 
travels abroad, not the technician.  Or, the technician needs to see and to learn 
about new ways of doing, new standards.  (Interview 24 March 2010)  
 
In this case learning and knowledge updating appears to have been a pre-condition for 
policy transfer.  Without it ‘national experts know only their own standards and nothing 
more.  It is impossible to debate and convince them of something else in this case’ 
(Interview: 24 March 2010)).  While a pre-condition, learning does not imply that transfer 
automatically takes place.  Domestic actors are not always convinced of the efficiency of 
external solutions.  The implementation of foreign standards of hospital design in Ukraine 
and Moldova depended on the struggles between domestic actors who learned and were 
convinced to modernize hospital based on foreign experience and others who were ‘stuck’ 
(attached to or convinced of the efficiency) of the inherited models.   
 
The empirical evidence provided by both the Moldovan and Ukrainian cases confirm the 
assumption that transfer is better implemented when domestic actors integrate the 
transferred solutions into their cognitive frames and/or when they see it as a resource.  
Both Ukrainian and Moldovan actors agreed to put in practice the foreign solutions when 
they understood them and were convinced of their efficiency and feasibility in their 
country, as well as when they saw it as a way to modernize their hospital design.   
 
Time, Timing and Tempo 
  
Based on our case studies it appears the longer transfer takes the more likely new actors 
are to enter the process, bringing new interests and leading to new conflicts which are 
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likely to result in the transformation of the policy solution.  This assumption is 
complicated by the nature of the transfer processes, which tends to involve multiple 
stages, where different institutional settings and interactions among actors can alter 
outcomes.  Further complicating the picture is that the more a dominant actor is able to 
control the timings involved in the transfer, i.e. who and when different agents and ideas 
enter during the process, the more he is able to keep the transfer unaltered and closely to 
his preferences.  When a single actor can control the entire transfer and policymaking 
process, they are better able to control what is transferred and how it is translated into a 
new system.  However, when a single dominant actor is not present (or cannot convince 
local actors of their approach), a considerable range of outcomes and processes emerge.   
 
The development of hospital reform in Moldova and Ukraine illustrates that as the 
processes unfolded, new actors entered bringing a range of different interests and 
resources that altered the initial content.  For the Kiev hospital, the longer the process 
took, the more actors joined in the review of the plans, this led to further discussions and 
debates regarding the content of the transfer.  The plans designed by the French architects 
at the beginning of the project were first accepted by the Ukrainian contractor who 
wanted to copy the foreign standards.  Later, these plans were submitted to the Ukrainian 
medical staff, who added demands on the organisation of medical departments.  Because 
these demands concerned local regulations, Ukrainian architects modified the original 
French plans based largely on Soviet era design.  At one point, the Ukrainian contractor 
decided to avoid all local intervention and imposed the version offered by the French 
consultants.  He was able to do so while benefiting of political support from the President.  
Nevertheless, by the end of the project the political environment changed, and the 
Ukrainian contractor was not sure of obtaining the building permit from national 
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administrations (largely opposed to the President). So, when the Ukrainian 
administration demanded change in order to make them fit existing Ukrainian standards 
(backed-up by formal rules), the plans were modified again:  
 
At this stage of the project, we were not able to guarantee anymore the adoption of 
Western standards.  This is why we tried to speed up the project all along; we 
wanted to obtain the building permit while we had President on our side.  Now we 
had to adapt the plans and comply with the Ukrainian regulations.  It’s a pity for all 
the work we’ve done until now.  (Interview: 19 May 2010) 
 
The Ukrainian case underlines two points.  First, by the end of the project, the design of 
the Kiev hospital had the imprint of various actors’ interventions, each of which drove it 
away from its initial form.  Second, the Ukrainian contractor was able to keep the Western 
design close to its original model, despite the intervention, as long as he controlled who 
and when they entered the process.   
 
In Moldova, the participation of the medical staff effectively forced German architects to 
modify the project:  
 
I don’t know where the German consultant saw medical staff working this way, and 
in these conditions, but we don’t think this can work for us in Moldova.  We have 
different conditions here.  So, we asked them to change their initial design and to 
increase the number of operating theatres (Interview: 3 April 2010).   
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As in Ukraine, the participation of the local architect resulted in the introduction of 
domestic standards and a step away from the foreign design.  Our point is not to analyse 
the degree of adaptation or transformation but to stress the evolution of the foreign 
solutions is a process that appears to be stimulated the longer the process of transfer 
takes, and as new actors enter the process and work at altering the initial model or idea.   
 
In our case studies the degree of change of the initial model appeared to be correlated to 
the duration of the transfer agent’s presence in the policy process.  We found that the 
longer the sender was active in the process more likely their solution was adopted (or 
adopted with a minimum of alteration).  This is preference by two observations: first, the 
longer interaction occurred, the stronger the relationship between the senders and the 
receivers become, which appeared to favour processes of learning what the sender was 
teaching; and second, that the interaction and involvement needed to occur at all the 
stages of the process.  We stress that senders do not necessarily need to be physically 
present in the country where the transfer takes place.  Rather, senders can take the 
receivers through a process of immersion in which the receiver comes to see the sender/s 
model as their own.  When this works, senders can avoid becoming bogged down in the 
institutional obstacles and the power struggles that could interfere with the transfer if 
they were to be seen to be actively involved.  In this, sequencing does not imply that it is 
a static and fixed framework where things can go only one way and not the other.  On the 
contrary, by following the actions of actors during the various stages, we can observe how 
at different moments in time the transfer can be more or less fluid, how it takes one path 
or another and how this ultimately shapes the content of what is transferred and 
ultimately implemented.   
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In light of our findings, we conclude that as a general principle, the longer a sender is able 
to remain involved, the less transformation of the initial model occurs at the domestic 
level.  However, this is only true under the appropriate circumstances.  If the political 
context or ruling parties change, even active senders can find their solutions altered or 
rejected.  Similarly, while actors may be able to influence the formation of a policy to their 
advantage, once they work at the local level, they face a range of obstacles that may dilute 
their efforts.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper unpacks what is often taken as a straightforward process, were power is static, 
actors are either for or against a transfer and the entire process follows some form of 
rationality.  What we found is that none of these assumptions are entirely correct.  Seldom 
can a single actor dominate the entire transfer process.  Hence the further the policy 
moves into a political system the more likely it is to be transformed by domestic actors.   
 
It is not enough to examine transfer as a one-off event; it must be seen as a process that 
develops as it enters and works its way through the domestic policymaking setting.  In 
this, time, timing and tempo matter, despite the infrequency in which they appear in 
transfer studies.  At a minimum the ability (or not) of domestic actors to slow down (or 
speed up) the process of transfer, policymaking or implementation act to alter power 
relations and the amount of information available.  Alone, these acts are sufficient (though 
not necessary) to help domestic opposition collate and work at transforming initial 
lessons or policies brought from abroad (or prevent them from ever forming).  We also 
observe that under the specific circumstances powerful dominant actors can force policy 
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change.  Though this often depends on the ability to guide (co-opt domestic players) the 
policy through its implementation, as in the case of the IMF and World Bank conditionality 
linked domestic preference shaping programs in Moldova. Some situations allow 
dominant actors control most of the time, at others, domestic actors retain power to 
reform imported solutions in ways unintended by the sender.  For instance, it is clear that 
legal codes and traditional ways of doing things are often paths that must be overcome 
(or adapted to) if transfer is to progress smoothly.  As this study shows, this is particularly 
salient for post-Soviet states where inherited institutions, structures and ways of doing 
influenced the power agency during transfer processes. Despite the fact that Ukraine had 
more domestic resources for reforming healthcare facilities than Moldova (more 
consultants and training institutes), Ukrainian decision-makers still chose to appeal to 
Western architectural firms for the construction of new hospitals, just as their Moldovan 
counterparts did.  At the same time, inherited institutional structures influenced the 
power relationships in similar ways in both Moldova and Ukraine: even though Moldova 
had fewer structural impediments to the development of healthcare facilities, the transfer 
of architectural norms from Western consultants opposed local resistance when local 
actors intervened or when inherited norms had to be applied.  As in Ukraine, domestic 
actors leading the hospital modernization process had to make arrangements and 
exemptions in order to make transfer happen.  Finally, both Ukrainian and Moldovan 
decision-makers used the transfer processes of their hospital modernisation not only for 
reforming hospitals but also for reforming parts of their architectural norms for 
healthcare facilities. In this, the initial transfer of Western design consultants for the 
hospital modernization open the way for reforming architectural rules and norms for the 
construction of healthcare facilities in both countries. 
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Understanding structures while crucial is not enough.  It is also important to understand 
how the actors involved in the transfer processes use structures to shape the transfer 
process.  For instance, if agents of transfer are able to use or create institutions to help 
them act as teachers it is more likely that the transfer will occur as planned.  Overall what 
we showed is that agent interaction is a central variable in explaining the outcomes of 
policy transfers.  This interaction must be viewed and understood in more subtle ways 
than rational choice preferences of actors.  Actors’ preferences change through different 
processes and through time.  Without taking power relations, learning, as well as time and 
timing seriously when studying policy transfer, the outcome of the transfer process is 
unlikely to be fully understood or appreciated.   
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